Does Tax Evasion Affect Unemployment and Educational Choice?

Arbeitspapier

While examining the macroeconomic effects of government tax and punishment policies, this paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers are assumed to differ in ability, and the choice of education is determined endogenously. Job opportunities in an informal sector are available only to workers who choose not to acquire higher education. We find that increased punishment of informal activities increases the number of educated workers and reduces the number of unemployed workers. Considering welfare, we show it is optimal to choose punishment rates so to more than fully counteract the distortion created by the government’s inability to tax the informal sector.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working paper ; No. 12-2003

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Tax Evasion and Avoidance ; Analysis of Education ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
• Thema: Tax evasion ; underground economy ; education ; matching ; unemployment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kolm, Ann-Sofie ; Larsen, Birthe
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
• (wo): Frederiksberg
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/208474
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ