A Montero auction mechanism for regulating unobserved use of the commons

Arbeitspapier

Regulating externalities from the use of common resources is often hampered by the regulator's inability to accurately observe individual firms' resource use. Allocating resource use through taxes on aggregate use, which often can be observed, has been suggested (Segerson, 1988); however, these taxes are vulnerable to collusion and strategic behavior and they generate inefficient entry-exit incentives. To address these disadvantages, I suggest using a Montero (2008)-type auction mechanism to allocate licenses for unobserved use of common resources and to induce compliance with these licenses through an enforcement tax on the differences between aggregated licenses issued and observed aggregated resource use.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFRO Working Paper ; No. 2015/07

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water ; Externalities ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Economics of Regulation
• Thema: incentive mechanisms ; unobservable resource use ; non-point emissions ; truthful revelation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hansen, Lars Gårn
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO)
• (wo): Copenhagen
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/204387
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ