Arbeitspapier

Nonparametric identification of auction models with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity

We propose a novel methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price auction models with independent private values, which accommodates auction-specific unobserved heterogeneity and bidder asymmetries, based on recent results from the econometric literature on nonclassical measurement error in Hu and Schennach (2008). Unlike Krasnokutskaya (2009), we do not require that equilibrium bids scale with the unobserved heterogeneity. Our approach accommodates a wide variety of applications, including settings in which there is an unobserved reserve price, an unobserved cost of bidding, or an unobserved number of bidders, as well as those in which the econometrician fails to observe some factor with a non-multiplicative effect on bidder values.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: cemmap working paper ; No. CWP15/09

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Auktion
Statistischer Fehler
Nichtparametrisches Verfahren

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hu, Yingyao
McAdams, David
Shum, Matthew
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap)
(wo)
London
(wann)
2009

DOI
doi:10.1920/wp.cem.2009.1509
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hu, Yingyao
  • McAdams, David
  • Shum, Matthew
  • Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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