Artikel

Private benefits of control, growth opportunities and investor protection

We develop a model to illustrate that controlling shareholders choose the level of investor protection that maximizes their own interests. Controlling shareholders in companies with complicated control structures can easily extract private benefits and are thus reluctant to enhance investor protection which would necessitate increased transparency. In contrast, controlling shareholders in companies with valuable growth opportunities are willing to improve investor protection so that they can benefit from the increased value resulting from the lower cost of capital. We test this prediction using firm-level data in China. The results show that the level of investor protection increases with decreases in control structure opacity and increases in growth opportunities. The correlation is more significant for enforcement than for the mechanisms of investor protection.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: China Journal of Accounting Research ; ISSN: 1755-3091 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2009 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 123-145 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier

Klassifikation
Management
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Business and Securities Law
Thema
Private benefits of control
Growth opportunities
Investor protection

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Xiao, Min
You, Jiaxing
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Elsevier
(wo)
Amsterdam
(wann)
2009

DOI
doi:10.1016/S1755-3091(13)60011-8
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Xiao, Min
  • You, Jiaxing
  • Elsevier

Entstanden

  • 2009

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