Arbeitspapier
Path Dependence Without Denying Deliberation : An Exercise Model Connecting Rationality and Evolution
Traditional game theory usually relies on commonly known decision rationality meaning that choices are made in view of their consequences (the shadow of the future). Evolutionary game theory, however, denies any cognitive deliberation by assuming that choice behavior evolves due to its past success (the shadow of the past) as typical in evolutionary biology. Indirect evolution does not consider the two opposite approaches as mutually exclusive but allows to combine them in various ways (Berninghaus et al., 2003). Here we provide a simple application allowing any linear combination of rational deliberation and path dependence, i.e. of the two "shadows".
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 282
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
Rationales Verhalten
Theorie
path dependency
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Güth, Werner
Stadler, Manfred
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- (where)
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Tübingen
- (when)
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2004
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-18264
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Güth, Werner
- Stadler, Manfred
- Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Time of origin
- 2004