Arbeitspapier

Path Dependence Without Denying Deliberation : An Exercise Model Connecting Rationality and Evolution

Traditional game theory usually relies on commonly known decision rationality meaning that choices are made in view of their consequences (the shadow of the future). Evolutionary game theory, however, denies any cognitive deliberation by assuming that choice behavior evolves due to its past success (the shadow of the past) as typical in evolutionary biology. Indirect evolution does not consider the two opposite approaches as mutually exclusive but allows to combine them in various ways (Berninghaus et al., 2003). Here we provide a simple application allowing any linear combination of rational deliberation and path dependence, i.e. of the two "shadows".

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 282

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
Rationales Verhalten
Theorie
path dependency

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Güth, Werner
Stadler, Manfred
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
(where)
Tübingen
(when)
2004

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-18264
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Güth, Werner
  • Stadler, Manfred
  • Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät

Time of origin

  • 2004

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