Arbeitspapier

Government Size and Economic Growth in an Endogenous Growth Model with Rent-seeking

We explore the relationship between government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with human capital and an unproductive capital which facilitates rent-seeking. With exogenous as well as endogenous time discounting, we find a non-monotonic relationship between the size of government and economic growth. We find that with very high (low) discounting, there is a unique low (high) growth equilibrium, regardless of the size of government. For the intermediate range of discounting, there are multiple equilibria and the growth outcome depends on the size of government. With endogenous time discounting, the growth outcome is path-dependent and depends on the level of inherited human capital. However, there is only one stable growth regime and the economy endogenously switches to it. When the institutional constraints on rent seeking are not extremely high, the stable regime is the one in which there is a high-growth equilibrium for a smaller size of the government and for larger size, both the high-growth and the low-growth equilibrium coexist. When the institutional constraints on rent seeking are extremely high, there exists only a unique high-growth equilibrium irrespective of the size of government. Furthermore, economies with bigger size of the government and/or with poor quality institutions will take longer to endogenously switch to this stable growth regime.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: GLO Discussion Paper ; No. 131

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Institutions and Growth
Thema
Government size
Rent-seeking
Economic Growth
Human capital
Discounting

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Wadho, Waqar
Ayaz, Umair
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Global Labor Organization (GLO)
(wo)
Maastricht
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Wadho, Waqar
  • Ayaz, Umair
  • Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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