Konferenzbeitrag

Ellsberg Games

In classic game theory, agents use mixed strategies in the form of objective and probabilistically precise devices to conceal their actions. We introduce the larger set of probabilistically imprecise devices as strategies and study the consequences for the basic results of normal form games. While Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the extended game, there arise new Ellsberg equilibria with distinct outcomes, as we illustrate by negotiation games with three players. We characterize Ellsberg equilibria in two-person conflict and coordination games. These equilibria turn out to be consistent with experimental deviations from Nash equilibrium play.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Game Theory ; No. E15-V3

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Riedel, Frank
Sass, Linda
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
(where)
Kiel und Hamburg
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Riedel, Frank
  • Sass, Linda
  • ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

Time of origin

  • 2013

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