Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions

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Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main

ISSN: 2153-0793

Extent: Online-Ressource

Language: Englisch

Notes: online resource.

Bibliographic citation: Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions ; day:8 ; month:10 ; year:2022 ; pages:1-33
Dynamic games and applications ; (8.10.2022), 1-33

Creator: Fu, Jing
Page, Frank H.
Zigrand, Jean-Pierre

Contributor: SpringerLink (Online service)

DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00478-4

URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023012210433790808383

Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.

Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:39 AM CEST

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Fu, Jing
Page, Frank H.
Zigrand, Jean-Pierre
SpringerLink (Online service)

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Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions

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