Arbeitspapier
Strategic Withholding through Production Failures
Anecdotal evidence indicates that electricity producers use production failures to disguise strategic reductions of capacity in order to influence prices, but systematic evidence is lacking. We use a quasi-experimental set up and data from the Swedish energy market to examine such behavior. In a market without strategic withholding, the decision of reporting a failure should be independent of the market price. We show that marginal producers in fact base their decision to report a failure in part on prices, which indicates that failures are a result of economic incentives as well as of technical problems.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1015
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Policy: Other
Electric Utilities
- Thema
-
Electricity markets
Urgent Market Messages (UMMs)
Unplanned failures
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fogelberg, Sara
Lazarczyk, Ewa
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fogelberg, Sara
- Lazarczyk, Ewa
- Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Entstanden
- 2014