Arbeitspapier

Strategic Withholding through Production Failures

Anecdotal evidence indicates that electricity producers use production failures to disguise strategic reductions of capacity in order to influence prices, but systematic evidence is lacking. We use a quasi-experimental set up and data from the Swedish energy market to examine such behavior. In a market without strategic withholding, the decision of reporting a failure should be independent of the market price. We show that marginal producers in fact base their decision to report a failure in part on prices, which indicates that failures are a result of economic incentives as well as of technical problems.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1015

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Policy: Other
Electric Utilities
Thema
Electricity markets
Urgent Market Messages (UMMs)
Unplanned failures

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fogelberg, Sara
Lazarczyk, Ewa
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fogelberg, Sara
  • Lazarczyk, Ewa
  • Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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