Deception Choice and Audit Design - The Importance of Being Earnest

Konferenzbeitrag

We study deception choices and deception detection in a tax compliance experiment. We find large systematic differences in individual deception abilities. Tax payers are conscious about their own deception abilities. The empirical outcomes are in line with a theory suggesting that tax payers make their choices whether to underreport or report truthfully on the basis of their own deception ability. Tax payers with high deception ability are more likely to underreport. This selection effect is stronger if the fines for underreporting are higher. These results provide an (additional) reason why random audits are superior to audits based on discretionary choice.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Taxation III ; No. C15-V3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lohse, Tim ; Konrad, Kai A. ; Qari, Salmai
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel und Hamburg
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100577
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET