Deception Choice and Audit Design - The Importance of Being Earnest

Konferenzbeitrag

We study deception choices and deception detection in a tax compliance experiment. We find large systematic differences in individual deception abilities. Tax payers are conscious about their own deception abilities. The empirical outcomes are in line with a theory suggesting that tax payers make their choices whether to underreport or report truthfully on the basis of their own deception ability. Tax payers with high deception ability are more likely to underreport. This selection effect is stronger if the fines for underreporting are higher. These results provide an (additional) reason why random audits are superior to audits based on discretionary choice.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Taxation III ; No. C15-V3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Lohse, Tim ; Konrad, Kai A. ; Qari, Salmai
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (wo): Kiel und Hamburg
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100577
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ