Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments

Arbeitspapier

We study infinitely repeated two player games with perfect information, where each period consists of two stages: one in which the parties simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. We first derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Pareto-optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. Afterwards, we examine different concepts of renegotiation-proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation-proof payoffs.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 259

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
• Thema: renegotiation ; infinitely repeated games ; side payments ; optimal penal codes ; Unvollständiger Vertrag ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Wiederholte Spiele ; Schuldrecht ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kranz, Sebastian ; Ohlendorf, Susanne
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13293
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93769
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13293-1
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ