Time Is on My Side: Relational Contracts and Aggregate Welfare

Arbeitspapier

This paper develops a simple general equilibrium model which establishes a link between the patience of economic agents and the well-being of nations. We show that firms in long-term oriented countries can mitigate hold-up inefficiencies by engaging with their suppliers in relational contracting – informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships. Our model predicts that countries with a higher level of patience will exhibit greater economic well-being and higher total factor productivity. We provide empirical evidence in line with the predictions of our theory.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11387

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Organization of Production ; Economic Development: General
• Thema: time preferences ; relational contracting ; aggregate welfare ; TFP

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kukharskyy, Bohdan ; Pflüger, Michael P.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/177191
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ