Arbeitspapier
Bargaining, search, and outside options
This paper studies a two-sided incomplete information bargaining model between a seller and a buyer. The buyer has an outside option, which is modeled as a sequential search process during which he can also choose to return to bargaining at any time. Two cases considered: In Regime I, both agents have symmetric information about the search parameters. We find that, in contrast to bargaining with complete information, the option to return to bargaining is not redundant in equilibrium. However, the no-delay result still holds. In Regime II, where agents have asymmetric information about the outside option, delay is possible. The solution characterizes the parameters for renegotiation and those for search with no return to the bargaining table.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2007-16
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- Subject
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bargaining
two-sided incomplete information
outside option
search
Verhandlungstheorie
Unvollkommene Information
Marktmechanismus
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Gantner, Anita
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
- (where)
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Innsbruck
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gantner, Anita
- University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
Time of origin
- 2007
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