Arbeitspapier
Outside Options in Probabilistic Coalition Situations
In this paper, I introduce an extension of (TU) games with a coalition structure. Taking a situation where all coalitions are already established is not reasonable in order to forecast the reality; there is not only one possible coalition, there are several. I consider situations where coalitions are not established yet and take into account the likelihood of each possible coalition. This leads to a generalized, probabilistic setting for coalition structures. Probabilistic versions of known axioms are introduced as well as new probabilistic axioms. Generalizations of both the outside-option-sensitive chi-value (Casajus, Soc Choice Welf 32, 1-13, 2009) and its outside-option-insensitive pendant, the component restricted Shapley value (Aumann and Drèze, Int. J. Game Theory 3, 217-237, 1974), are defined and axiomatic characterizations are given.
- ISBN
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978-3-86788-270-5
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 236
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Thema
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TU game
coalition structure
outside option
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Belau, Julia
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
- (wo)
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Essen
- (wann)
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2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Belau, Julia
- Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Entstanden
- 2011