Arbeitspapier

Anti-dumping Duties and the Byrd Amendment

The Byrd amendment to US anti-dumping law distributes the revenue from anti-dumping duties imposed on foreign firms to the domestic firms that lodged the complaint of dumping. When the government sets its anti-dumping duty to maximise a welfare function that attaches greater weight to the profits of the domestic industry than to consumer surplus or tax revenue, it is shown that the Byrd amendment will lead to lower duties and higher welfare if the weight on the profits of the domestic industry is sufficiently large. Also, the Byrd amendment makes it less likely that the anti-dumping duty will be prohibitive.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: LICOS Discussion Paper ; No. 149

Classification
Wirtschaft
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Subject
Tariffs
US trade policy
WTO
Cournot oligopoly.
Antidumping
Außenhandelspolitik
WTO-Regeln
Oligopol
USA

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Collie, David R.
Vandenbussche, Hylke
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Centre for Transition Economics
(where)
Leuven
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Collie, David R.
  • Vandenbussche, Hylke
  • Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Centre for Transition Economics

Time of origin

  • 2004

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