Artikel
Directives, expressives, and motivation
When an agent's motivation is sensitive to how his supervisor thinks about the agent's competence, the supervisor has to take into account both informational and expressive contents of her message to the agent. This paper shows that the supervisor can credibly express her trust in the agent's ability only by being unclear about what to do. Suggesting what to do, i.e., 'directives,' could reveal the supervisor's 'distrust' and reduce the agent's equilibrium effort level even though it provides useful information about the decision environment. There is also an equilibrium in which directives are neutral in expressive content. However, it is shown that neologism proofness favors equilibria in which directives are double-edged swords.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 175-210 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Subject
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Communication games
directives
expressives
economics and language
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Suzuki, Toru
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2017
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE1843
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Suzuki, Toru
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2017