Artikel

Directives, expressives, and motivation

When an agent's motivation is sensitive to how his supervisor thinks about the agent's competence, the supervisor has to take into account both informational and expressive contents of her message to the agent. This paper shows that the supervisor can credibly express her trust in the agent's ability only by being unclear about what to do. Suggesting what to do, i.e., 'directives,' could reveal the supervisor's 'distrust' and reduce the agent's equilibrium effort level even though it provides useful information about the decision environment. There is also an equilibrium in which directives are neutral in expressive content. However, it is shown that neologism proofness favors equilibria in which directives are double-edged swords.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 175-210 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
Communication games
directives
expressives
economics and language

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Suzuki, Toru
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2017

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1843
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Suzuki, Toru
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2017

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