Arbeitspapier

Infrastructure investment in network industries ; the role of incentive regulation and regulatory independence

This paper finds that coherent regulatory policies can boost investment in network industries of OECD economies. Rate-of-return regulation is generally thought to result in overinvestment, while incentive regulation is believed to entail underinvestment. Yet, previous empirical work has generally found that the introduction of incentive regulation has not systematically changed investment in network industries. According to the theoretical literature, regulatory uncertainty exposes both types of regimes to the danger of underinvestment. However, regulatory uncertainty is arguably higher under rate-of-return regulation because investment decisions (what can be included in the rate base) are usually evaluated in a discretionary manner, while firms operating under incentive regulation are less affected by this behaviour. In addition, incentive regulation encourages investment in cost-reducing technologies. Using Bayesian model averaging techniques, this paper shows that incentive regulation implemented jointly with an independent sector regulator (indicating lower regulatory uncertainty) has a strong positive impact on investment in network industries. In addition, lower barriers to entry are also found to encourage sectoral investment. These results support the importance of implementing policies in a coherent framework.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2642

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Economics of Regulation
Utilities: General
Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy
Thema
network industries
regulation
incentive regulation
price cap
cost-plus regulation
rate-of-return regulation
regulatory independence
investment
Infrastruktur
Versorgungswirtschaft
Infrastrukturinvestition
Anreizregulierung

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Égert, Balázs
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Égert, Balázs
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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