Arbeitspapier
An Owen-Type Value for Games with Two-Level Communication Structures
We introduce an Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structures, being structures where the players are partitioned into a coalition structure such that there exists restricted communication between as well as within the a priori unions of the coalition structure. Both types of communication restrictions are modeled by an undirected communication graph, so there is a communication graph between the unions of the coalition structure as well as a communication graph on the players in every union. We also show that, for particular two-level communication structures, the Owen value and the Aumann-Dreze value for games with coalition structures, the Myerson value for communication graph games and the equal surplus division solution appear as special cases of this new value.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-089/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Thema
-
TU game
coalition structure
communication graph
Owen value
Myerson value
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van den Brink, Rene
Khmelnitskaya, Anna
van der Laan, Gerard
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van den Brink, Rene
- Khmelnitskaya, Anna
- van der Laan, Gerard
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2011
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