Arbeitspapier
Contracts and promises: an approach to pre-play agreements
In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on whether actions are strategic complements or substitutes. With strategic substitutes, there is a conflict between Pareto-efficiency and the incentives to abide. The opposite tends to be true when actions are strategic complements. The results are interpreted in the context of legal contracts and in that of informal mutual promises.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2008,088
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Contract Law
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
- Thema
-
Partnerships
contracts
pre-play communication
legal enforcement
social norms
guilt
Vertragstheorie
Strafe
Pareto-Optimum
Soziale Norm
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Miettinen, Topi
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Miettinen, Topi
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008
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