Arbeitspapier
Coordination of bank branches under uncertainty
Bank planning models should at least meet two requirements. Firstly, the multiperiod character of most banking activities should be considered. Secondly, one should allow for the uncertainty of future events. Lots of models have been constructed fulfilling these requirements. But only in a few models the problem of the underlying organizational structure of the bank has been incorporated. This must be criticized because the success of model implementation depends upon how the formal planning model is embedded in the organization ...
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel ; No. 99
- Klassifikation
-
Management
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schmidt, Reinhart
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
1981
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schmidt, Reinhart
- Universität Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre
- ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Entstanden
- 1981
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