Wage bargaining and political strength in the public sector

Arbeitspapier

This paper analysis the link between political strength and public sector wages using a unique matched individual-employer data set for Norwegian local governments during the period 1990-1998. The results indicate that political strength, measured in several ways, has a positive effect on wages, while administrative strength, measured by the tenure of the chief executive, has a negative effect. The positive effect of political strength is consistent with a model in which the budgetary process is a multistage game and employment is determined in an interaction with interest groups prior to the wage bargain.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1629

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; State and Local Budget and Expenditures ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Public Sector Labor Markets
• Thema: public sector labor market ; wage bargaining ; political strength ; budgetary process ; Besoldung ; Lohnverhandlungstheorie ; Public Choice ; Macht ; Kommunalverwaltung ; Schätzung ; Norwegen

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Falch, Torberg ; Str?m, Bjarne
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19093
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ