The Implementation Duality

Arbeitspapier

We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this duality can be used to obtain a sharpening of the taxation principle, to obtain a general existence result for solutions to the principal-agent problem, to show that (just as in the quasilinear case) all increasing decision functions are implementable under a single crossing condition, and to obtain an existence result for stable outcomes featuring positive assortative matching in a matching model.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WWZ Discussion Paper ; No. 2015/01

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Economics of Contract: Theory
• Thema: Implementation ; Duality ; Galois Connection ; Imperfectly Transferable Utility ; Principal-Agent Model ; Two-Sided Matching

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Nöldeke, Georg ; Samuelson, Larry
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5451/unibas-ep61331
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123469
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ