Konferenzbeitrag

Incentives to Acquire Information under Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure

This paper compares the incentives of a party to acquire information prior to negotiating contractual terms with a second party. Two legal regimes are compared: disclosing information before negotiations start is mandatory or it remains voluntary. By assumption, information can only truthfully be disclosed but, under voluntary disclosure, the fact that no evidence was found cannot credibly be communicated. If the party that may acquire information enjoys encompassing bargaining power, the incentives to acquire information will be excessive relative to first best quite generally. Otherwise, more surprisingly, acquisition incentives turn out insufficient even under voluntary disclosure for an informational setting referred to as selfish acquisition. For another setting, referred to as cooperative acquisition, the incentives under voluntary disclosure are even lower as compared with mandatory disclosure. All results hold independently of the underlying bargaining structure and equilibrium selection as exclusive use of constraints is made that hold for equilibrium payoffs from any bargaining game.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Information ; No. G13-V3

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Contract Law
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schweizer, Urs
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Beteiligte

  • Schweizer, Urs

Entstanden

  • 2015

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