Lakatos’ Quasi-Empiricism Revisited

Abstract: The central idea of Lakatos’ quasi-empiricism view of the philosophy of mathematics is that truth values are transmitted bottom-up, but only falsity can be transmitted from basic statements. As it is falsity but not truth that flows bottom-up, Lakatos emphasizes that observation and induction play no role in both conjecturing and proving phases in mathematics. In this paper, I argue that Lakatos’ view that one cannot obtain primitive conjectures by induction contradicts the history of mathematics, and therefore undermines his quasi-empiricism theory. I argue that his misconception of induction causes this view of Lakatos. Finally, I propose that Wittgenstein’s view that “mathematics does have a grammatical nature, but it is also rooted in empirical regularities” suggests the possibility to improve Lakatos’ view by maintaining his quasi-empiricism while accepting the role induction plays in the conjecturing phase.

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Lakatos’ Quasi-Empiricism Revisited ; volume:36 ; number:2 ; year:2022 ; pages:227-246 ; extent:20 ; Kriterion ; 36, Heft 2 (2022), 227-246 (gesamt 20)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Zeng, Wei

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/krt-2022-0007
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022111213042062196733
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:33 AM CEST