Arbeitspapier
OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION WITH QUASI-LINEAR PREFERENCES REVISITED
With quasi-linear in leisure preferences, closed-form solutions for the marginal tax rates and the marginal utility of consumption under utilitarian and maxi-min objectives depend only on the skill distribution. Bunching induced by binding second-order incentive conditions also depends only on the distribution, but does not affect solutions in the non-bunched range. These are affected if bunching is caused by binding non-negative income constraints. Specific skill distributions are considered and it shown that the pattern of marginal tax rates depend critically on whether or not the skill distribution is truncated at the upper end.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 984
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Thema
-
Optimal Income Tax
Quasi-Linear Preferences
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Boadway, Robin
Cuff, Katherine
Marchand, Maurice
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Kingston (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Boadway, Robin
- Cuff, Katherine
- Marchand, Maurice
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1999