Arbeitspapier

Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Private Participation Costs

We study equilibria in second price auctions when bidders are independently and privately informed about both their values and participation costs and their joint distributions across bidders are not necessarily identical. We show that there always exists an equilibrium in this general setting with two dimensional types of ex ante heterogeneous bidders. We provide conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Moreover, when the bidders are ex ante symmetric, we show that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. We also identify sufficient conditions for existence of asymmetric equilibria.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1421

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Two-Dimensional Types
Private Participation Costs
Second Price Auctions
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cao, Xiaoyong
Tan, Guofu
Tian, Guoqiang
Yilankaya, Okan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)
(wo)
Istanbul
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cao, Xiaoyong
  • Tan, Guofu
  • Tian, Guoqiang
  • Yilankaya, Okan
  • Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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