Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Private Participation Costs

Arbeitspapier

We study equilibria in second price auctions when bidders are independently and privately informed about both their values and participation costs and their joint distributions across bidders are not necessarily identical. We show that there always exists an equilibrium in this general setting with two dimensional types of ex ante heterogeneous bidders. We provide conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Moreover, when the bidders are ex ante symmetric, we show that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. We also identify sufficient conditions for existence of asymmetric equilibria.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 1421

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; Noncooperative Games ; Auctions ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Two-Dimensional Types ; Private Participation Costs ; Second Price Auctions ; Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Cao, Xiaoyong ; Tan, Guofu ; Tian, Guoqiang ; Yilankaya, Okan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)
• (where): Istanbul
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108662
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET