Arbeitspapier
Reputation with long run players and imperfect
We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2's type is commonly known. We show that a sufficiently patient player 1 can leverage player 2's uncertainty about his type to secure his highest payoff in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1507
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
Repeated Games
Reputation
Equal Discount Factor
Long-run Players
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Atakan, Alp E.
Ekmekci, Mehmet
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Atakan, Alp E.
- Ekmekci, Mehmet
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2009
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