Reputation with long run players and imperfect observation

Arbeitspapier

Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players with equal discount factors. We restrict attention to an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous move stage game where actions of player 2 are imperfectly observed. The set of commitment types for player 1 is taken as any (countable) set of finite automata. In this context, for a restricted class of stage games, we provide a one sided reputation result. If player 1 is a particular commitment type with positive probability and player 2's actions are imperfectly observed, then player 1 receives his highest pay-off, compatible with individual rationality, in any Bayes-Nash equilibria, as agents become patient.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1506

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Repeated Games ; Reputation ; Equal Discount Factor ; Long-run Players ; Imperfect Observation ; Complicated Types ; Finite Automaton

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Atakan, Alp E. ; Ekmekci, Mehmet
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59624
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET