Arbeitspapier
The Timing of Choice-Enhancing Policies
Recent studies investigate policies motivating consumers to make an active choice as a way to protect unsophisticated consumers. We analyze the optimal timing of such choice-enhancing policies when a firm can strategically react to them. In our model, a firm provides a contract with automatic renewal. We show that a policy intending to enhance consumers choices when they choose a contract can be detrimental to welfare. By contrast, a choice-enhancing policy at the time of contract renewal increases welfare more robustly. Our results highlight that policies should be targeted in timing to the actual choice inefficiency.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 49
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Consumer Protection
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Economics of Regulation
- Subject
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active choice
automatic renewal
automatic enrollment
procrastination
consumer naivete
present bias
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Murooka, Takeshi
Schwarz, Marco
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (where)
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München und Berlin
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Murooka, Takeshi
- Schwarz, Marco
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Time of origin
- 2017