Arbeitspapier

The Timing of Choice-Enhancing Policies

Recent studies investigate policies motivating consumers to make an active choice as a way to protect unsophisticated consumers. We analyse the optimal timing of such choice-enhancing policies when a firm can strategically react to them. In our model, a firm provides an automatic enrolment or renewal to consumers. We show that a conventional choice-enhancing policy, which decreases consumers’ switching costs when they are initially enroled, can be detrimental to consumer and social welfare. By contrast, an alternative policy that decreases consumers’ switching costs when the firm charges a higher price for the service increases consumer and social welfare more robustly.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5983

Classification
Wirtschaft
Consumer Protection
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Economics of Regulation
Subject
active choice
procrastination
present bias
automatic enrolment
automatic renewal
consumer naivete

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Murooka, Takeshi
Schwarz, Marco A.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Murooka, Takeshi
  • Schwarz, Marco A.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2016

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