Arbeitspapier

Size effect, neighbour effect and peripheral effect in cross-border tax games

This paper analyses a game theoretic model of tax competition in a system where tax authorities are revenue optimisers and countries are differentiated by size. The model accommodates more than two countries. In equilibrium, larger countries set higher tax rates non-cooperatively. By applying the Hotelling linear model, this paper gives examples where the size effect, neighbourhood effect, and peripheral effect coexist and push up the tax rate in equilibrium.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2014-19

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
Subject
tax competition
cross-border shopping
Nash equilibrium
peripheral effects

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Liu, Xin
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(where)
Kiel
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Liu, Xin
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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