Arbeitspapier
Size effect, neighbour effect and peripheral effect in cross-border tax games
This paper analyses a game theoretic model of tax competition in a system where tax authorities are revenue optimisers and countries are differentiated by size. The model accommodates more than two countries. In equilibrium, larger countries set higher tax rates non-cooperatively. By applying the Hotelling linear model, this paper gives examples where the size effect, neighbourhood effect, and peripheral effect coexist and push up the tax rate in equilibrium.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2014-19
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
- Thema
-
tax competition
cross-border shopping
Nash equilibrium
peripheral effects
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Liu, Xin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Liu, Xin
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Entstanden
- 2014