Arbeitspapier

Size effect, neighbour effect and peripheral effect in cross-border tax games

This paper analyses a game theoretic model of tax competition in a system where tax authorities are revenue optimisers and countries are differentiated by size. The model accommodates more than two countries. In equilibrium, larger countries set higher tax rates non-cooperatively. By applying the Hotelling linear model, this paper gives examples where the size effect, neighbourhood effect, and peripheral effect coexist and push up the tax rate in equilibrium.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2014-19

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
Thema
tax competition
cross-border shopping
Nash equilibrium
peripheral effects

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Liu, Xin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(wo)
Kiel
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Liu, Xin
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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