Voluntary teaming and effort

Arbeitspapier

In a series of experimental games, each of two players may choose between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration based on private effort, we frequently observe team remuneration chosen by both players. Team remuneration allows for high payoff for each player for cooperation, but at the same time provides individual incentives to take a free ride on the other player's effort. Due to significant cooperation we observe that in team remuneration participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that, when participants are not given the option of private remuneration, they cooperate significantly less.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 745

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: General ; Public Goods ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
• Subject: Team effort ; voluntary collaboration ; experimental economics ; Gruppenarbeit ; Vergütungssystem ; Leistungsmotivation ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Keser, Claudia ; Montmarquette, Claude
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27269
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET