Arbeitspapier

Voluntary support and ring-fencing in cross-border banks

We study supervisory interventions in cross-border banks under different institutional architectures in a model in which a bank may provide voluntary support to an impaired subsidiary using resources from a healthy subsidiary. While supranational architecture permits voluntary support, national architecture gives rise to inefficient ring-fencing of a healthy subsidiary when there is high correlation between the subsidiaries' assets. The enhanced cross-subsidiary support allowed by a supranational architecture affects banks' risk-taking, leading to a convergence of the default risk among cross-border banks with heterogeneous fundamentals. Finally, supranational architecture reduces the expected deposit insurance costs for banks with riskier fundamentals, but not for safer banks even when it could still be aggregate welfare improving.

ISBN
978-92-899-5272-9
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 2688

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
Thema
cross-border bank
supervisory intervention
supranational supervision
voluntarysupport
ring-fencing

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lóránth, Gyöngyi
Segura, Anatoli
Zeng, Jing
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.2866/05325
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lóránth, Gyöngyi
  • Segura, Anatoli
  • Zeng, Jing
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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