Arbeitspapier

Evolutionary Rent-Seeking

Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a rent-seeking contest differs from efficient rent-seeking behavior in a Nash equilibrium. We explore that implications of evolutionary stability for rent-seeking behavior and relate them to the well examined Nash equilibrium behavior. A most interesting result is an overdissipation law, which holds in evolutionary equilibrium.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 620

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Leininger, Wolfgang
Possajennikov, Alex
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  • Leininger, Wolfgang
  • Possajennikov, Alex
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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