Arbeitspapier
Evolutionary Rent-Seeking
Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a rent-seeking contest differs from efficient rent-seeking behavior in a Nash equilibrium. We explore that implications of evolutionary stability for rent-seeking behavior and relate them to the well examined Nash equilibrium behavior. A most interesting result is an overdissipation law, which holds in evolutionary equilibrium.
- Language
 - 
                Englisch
 
- Bibliographic citation
 - 
                Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 620
 
- Classification
 - 
                Wirtschaft
 
- Event
 - 
                Geistige Schöpfung
 
- (who)
 - 
                Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Leininger, Wolfgang
Possajennikov, Alex
 
- Event
 - 
                Veröffentlichung
 
- (who)
 - 
                Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
 
- (where)
 - 
                Munich
 
- (when)
 - 
                2001
 
- Handle
 
- Last update
 - 
                
                    
                        10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
 
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
 
Associated
- Hehenkamp, Burkhard
 - Leininger, Wolfgang
 - Possajennikov, Alex
 - Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
 
Time of origin
- 2001