Arbeitspapier
Evolutionary Rent-Seeking
Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a rent-seeking contest differs from efficient rent-seeking behavior in a Nash equilibrium. We explore that implications of evolutionary stability for rent-seeking behavior and relate them to the well examined Nash equilibrium behavior. A most interesting result is an overdissipation law, which holds in evolutionary equilibrium.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 620
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Leininger, Wolfgang
Possajennikov, Alex
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2001
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hehenkamp, Burkhard
- Leininger, Wolfgang
- Possajennikov, Alex
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2001