Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies

Arbeitspapier

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer besides her material well-being. A semi-responsible agent is an agent who, given what her opponents do, acts in an irresponsible manner when a responsible behavior poses obstacles to her material well-being. The class of efficient allocation rules that are Nash implementable is identified provided that there is at least one agent who is semi-responsible. The Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2017-05

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Subject: Nash equilibrium ; exchange economies ; intrinsic preferences for responsibility, ; boundary problem ; price-quantity mechanism

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lombardi, Michele ; Yoshihara, Naoki
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
• (where): Amherst, MA
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/174414
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET