Arbeitspapier
Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer besides her material well-being. A semi-responsible agent is an agent who, given what her opponents do, acts in an irresponsible manner when a responsible behavior poses obstacles to her material well-being. The class of efficient allocation rules that are Nash implementable is identified provided that there is at least one agent who is semi-responsible. The Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2017-05
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
Nash equilibrium
exchange economies
intrinsic preferences for responsibility,
boundary problem
price-quantity mechanism
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lombardi, Michele
Yoshihara, Naoki
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Amherst, MA
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lombardi, Michele
- Yoshihara, Naoki
- University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2017
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