Arbeitspapier

Regulation of morally responsible agents with motivation crowding

We study the regulation of a morally responsible agent in the context of a negative consumption externality and motivation crowding. In particular, we analyze how various governmental interventions affect the agent's motivation to assume moral responsibility. Employing a motivation-crowding model, we find that morally motivated behavior will, in general, not ensure Pareto efficiency without intervention. A Pigouvian tax may be efficient under motivation crowding. But the efficient taxe rate needs to be higher, which may lead to a full crowding-out of moral motivation. By contrast, an inefficiently low taxe rate may increase the market failure due to motivation crowding. Provision of information is efficient only in very specific cases but may be effective in reducing the extent of market failure. A complementary tax-and-information policy approach is superior to a tax as single instrument if its aim is to reduce consumption and if provision of information raises moral motivation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper Series in Economics ; No. 241

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Consumer Economics: Theory
Externalities
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Thema
Altruism
externality
moral motivation
motivation crowding
Pareto efficiency
regulation
responsibility
taxes
provision of information
Altruismus
Ethik
Motivation
Crowding out
Externer Effekt
Steuertarif
Information
Pareto-Optimum
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fünfgelt, Joachim
Baumgärtner, Stefan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
(wo)
Lüneburg
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fünfgelt, Joachim
  • Baumgärtner, Stefan
  • Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre

Entstanden

  • 2012

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