Endogenous Technology Sharing in R&D Intensive Industries

Abstract: This paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred outcome of a welfare maximising authority if ex ante marginal cost is sufficiently high, and the three-firm coalition is preferred otherwise. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcomes result in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. Aircraft engine manufacturing provides a case study, and indicates the importance of antitrust issues as an addition to the theory.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Endogenous Technology Sharing in R&D Intensive Industries ; volume:4 ; number:1 ; year:2010 ; extent:49 ; Economics / Journal articles. Journal articles ; 4, Heft 1 (2010) (gesamt 49)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Clark, Derek J. ; Sand, Jan Yngve

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-1
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2412130921035.285114696515
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 15.08.2025, 07:34 MESZ