Endogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industries

Artikel

This paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred outcome of a welfare maximising authority if ex ante marginal cost is sufficiently high, and the threefirm coalition is preferred otherwise. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcomes result in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. Aircraft engine manufacturing provides a case study, and indicates the importance of antitrust issues as an addition to the theory.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal ; ISSN: 1864-6042 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 2010-1 ; Pages: 1-48 ; Kiel: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: R&D ; endogenous coalitions ; asymmetric firms ; Industrielle Forschung ; Forschungskooperation ; Koalition ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Forschungskosten ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Konzentrationspolitik ; Flugzeugantrieb ; Theorie ; Welt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Clark, Derek J. ; Sand, Jan Yngve
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
• (wo): Kiel
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-1
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29632
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ