Negotiators' cognition: An experimental study on bilateral, integrative negotiation

Arbeitspapier

Many negotiations offer a potential for integrative agreements in which the parties can maximize joint gains (through logrolling) without competing for resources as in a 0-sum game; nevertheless negotiators often fail to exploit this potential and settle for suboptimal, distributive agreements. In this study a situation of two-issues bilateral negotiation has been considered. Our aim is to get some insight on the causes that prevent negotiators from reaching integrative, Pareto-optimal agreements. We ran two experiments (one with policy makers and one with students) in which we tested the "fixed pie bias" of negotiators, and we introduced a new explanation for suboptimality, based on the hypothesis of a satisficing (not optimizing) behavior of negotiators, which leads them to a "zone of agreement bias"(ZAB).

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 05/03

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Subject: integrative negotiation ; logrolling ; cognitive bias ; satisficing ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Beschränkte Rationalität ; Test ; Theorie ; Kognition ; Stimmentausch

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Reina, Livia
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Technische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften
• (where): Dresden
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48113
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET