Arbeitspapier
Electoral Cycles in Active Labor Market Policies
We examine how electoral motives influence active labor market policies that promote job-creation. Such policies reduce unemployment statistics. Using German state data for the period 1985 to 2004, we show that election-motivated politicians pushed job-promotion schemes before elections.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Labor Economics Policies
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Fiscal Policy
National Budget; Budget Systems
- Thema
-
political business cycles
opportunistic politicians
active labor market policies
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mechtel, Mario
Potrafke, Niklas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
- (wo)
-
Tübingen
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-55939
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Mechtel, Mario
- Potrafke, Niklas
- University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
Entstanden
- 2011
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