Should WTO dispute settlement be subsidized?

Arbeitspapier

This paper develops a model of the WTO dispute settlement process (DSP) to study the recent proposal by legal scholars to subsidize litigation costs. The high cost of litigation, so the argument, is a major obstacle for developing countries to using the DSP to enforce developed countries? compliance with WTO rules. The paper shows that this proposal may be misguided. In particular, a reduction of litigation costs may lead large countries to impose larger trade impediments where before they may have raised barriers only a little. Thus, a cost reduction may even weaken the smaller countries? position in the DSP. Moreover, the model sheds light on the structure of the dark figure of un-accused offenses, suggesting that the observed record of disputes notified to the WTO is systematically biased.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Economics Working Paper ; No. 2007-02

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
• Subject: Developing Countries ; Dispute Settlement ; GATT/WTO ; Tariff Retaliation ; Trade Disputes ; Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit ; WTO-Regeln ; Gerichtliche Prozesskosten ; Subvention ; Retorsionsmaßnahme ; Nord-Süd-Beziehungen ; Extensives Spiel ; Theorie ; Entwicklungsländer ; Industriestaaten

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Wilckens, Sebastian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Kiel University, Department of Economics
• (where): Kiel
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22020
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET