Arbeitspapier

Should WTO dispute settlement be subsidized?

This paper develops a model of the WTO dispute settlement process (DSP) to study the recent proposal by legal scholars to subsidize litigation costs. The high cost of litigation, so the argument, is a major obstacle for developing countries to using the DSP to enforce developed countries' compliance with WTO rules. The paper shows that this proposal may be misguided. In particular, a reduction of litigation costs may lead large countries to impose larger trade impediments where before they may have raised barriers only a little. Thus, a cost reduction may even weaken the smaller countries' position in the DSP. Moreover, the model sheds light on the structure of the dark figure of un-accused offenses, suggesting that the observed record of disputes notified to the WTO is systematically biased.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 62

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Thema
developing countries
dispute settlement
GATT/WTO
tariff retailiation
trade disputes
Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit
WTO-Regeln
Gerichtliche Prozesskosten
Subvention
Retorsionsmaßnahme
Nord-Süd-Beziehungen
Extensives Spiel
Theorie
Entwicklungsländer
Industriestaaten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Wilckens, Sebastian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
(wo)
Göttingen
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Wilckens, Sebastian
  • University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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