Arbeitspapier

Equilibrium involuntary unemployment under oligempory

We show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi-stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, employment, output and prices, and under constant returns there exists a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria involving unemployment. A firm does not undercut the equilibrium wage since then high wage firms would attract its workers, thus forcing the low wage firm out of both markets. Full employment equilibria may also exist, but only the involuntary unemployment equilibria are robust to decreasing returns.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 68

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Thema
involuntary unemployment
multi-stage game
imperfect competition
Arbeitslosigkeit
Gleichgewichtstheorie
Oligopol
Theorie
Unfreiwillige Arbeitslosigkeit

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kaas, Leo
Madden, Paul
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
(wo)
Vienna
(wann)
1999

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kaas, Leo
  • Madden, Paul
  • Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)

Entstanden

  • 1999

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