Arbeitspapier

Time Limits in a Two-tier Unemployment Benefit Scheme under Involuntary Unemployment

The consequences of introducing or tightening time limits on receiving high unemploymentbenefits are studied in a shirking model. Stricter time limits have an ambiguousimpact on the net wage, and changes of utility levels of employed workers and recipientsof high unemployment benefits have the same sign as the variation in the netwage. The utility differential between the two groups of unemployed shrinks. The relativeincome position of skilled workers moves in the same direction as the net wage ofunskilled workers. When access to high benefits is denied for caught shirkers, strictertime limits may decrease employment.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ifo Working Paper ; No. 29

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
Labor Contracts
Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers: General
Thema
Unemployment benefits
welfare benefits
time limits
efficiency wages

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Holzner, Christian
Meier, Volker
Werding, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Holzner, Christian
  • Meier, Volker
  • Werding, Martin
  • ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Entstanden

  • 2006

Ähnliche Objekte (12)