Arbeitspapier
Time Limits in a Two-tier Unemployment Benefit Scheme under Involuntary Unemployment
The consequences of introducing or tightening time limits on receiving high unemploymentbenefits are studied in a shirking model. Stricter time limits have an ambiguousimpact on the net wage, and changes of utility levels of employed workers and recipientsof high unemployment benefits have the same sign as the variation in the netwage. The utility differential between the two groups of unemployed shrinks. The relativeincome position of skilled workers moves in the same direction as the net wage ofunskilled workers. When access to high benefits is denied for caught shirkers, strictertime limits may decrease employment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ifo Working Paper ; No. 29
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
Labor Contracts
Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers: General
- Thema
-
Unemployment benefits
welfare benefits
time limits
efficiency wages
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Holzner, Christian
Meier, Volker
Werding, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Holzner, Christian
- Meier, Volker
- Werding, Martin
- ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
Entstanden
- 2006