Arbeitspapier
Dynamic mechanisms without money
We analyze the optimal design of dynamic mechanisms in the absence of transfers. The designer uses future allocation decisions to elicit private information. Values evolve according to a two-state Markov chain. We solve for the optimal allocation rule, which permits a simple implementation. Unlike with transfers, efficiency decreases over time, and both immiseration and its polar opposite are possible long-run outcomes. Considering the limiting environment in which time is continuous, we demonstrate that persistence hurts.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IHS Economics Series ; No. 310
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
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Mechanism design
Principal-Agent
Token mechanisms
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Guo, Yingni
Hörner, Johannes
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
- (wo)
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Vienna
- (wann)
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2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Guo, Yingni
- Hörner, Johannes
- Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Entstanden
- 2015