Artikel

Coordination games on dynamical networks

We propose a model in which agents of a population interacting according to a network of contacts play games of coordination with each other and can also dynamically break and redirect links to neighbors if they are unsatisfied. As a result, there is co-evolution of strategies in the population and of the graph that represents the network of contacts. We apply the model to the class of pure and general coordination games. For pure coordination games, the networks co-evolve towards the polarization of different strategies. In the case of general coordination games our results show that the possibility of refusing neighbors and choosing different partners increases the success rate of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 242-261 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
evolutionary game theory
coordination games
games on dynamical networks
co-evolution

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Tomassini, Marco
Pestelacci, Enea
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2010

DOI
doi:10.3390/g1030242
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Tomassini, Marco
  • Pestelacci, Enea
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2010

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